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1. Introduction
There is a general agreement among economists that free international trade is sub-optimal
in most theoretical cases when more than two countries are involved, and more than two goods
are traded. The canonical Ricardian model with two countries and two goods traded is a special
case that is far from typical. However, reversing international trade agreements could result in the
escalation of trade wars with profound consequences. This is particularly the case when multilat-
eral agreements sponsored by the international institutions including the World Trade Organiza-
tion（WTO）reach a stalemate.
The standard contemporary economic theory of international trade is based on the approach
proposed by Krugman（1979）in his seminal article titled Increasing returns, monopolistic competi-
tion, and international trade. Domestic economic policies and microeconomics conditions contrib-
ute to explain comparative advantages of firms, and implications for the countries in which they
operate. Since the conviction of optimality of free trade is not explained by science, it is essen-
tially an act of faith（McCulloch 1993）that does not easily tolerate dissident views. The gap com-
monly observed between theory and trade policy can be analyzed as the consequence of ideology
and, more importantly, political agenda and decisions influenced by lobbies. Economists formulate
recommendations on international trade agreement, but the political decision-making process is
essentially determined by the messages conveyed by lobbyists acting on behalf of business asso-
ciations and individual firms. The influence of lobbies is facilitated by the fact that most bureau-
crats and politicians involved in the decision-making process have limited or no training in eco-
nomics, as indicated by remarks such as “of course free trade is best in theory but ...” commonly
made in discussions regarding the difficulties to negotiate free trade agreements.
1 This text is based on a talk given at Kanagawa University, Yokohama on November 19, 2018.
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There is also a consensus among economists to acknowledge that most simulations gauging
the economic consequences of trade liberalization indicate that net macroeconomic gains account
for a small percentage of GDP, with large margins of error ; this is confirmed by ex post esti-
mates. Another major limitation of most studies attempting to assess gains from trade is that they
adopt a macroeconomic static comparative approach. It is notoriously difficult to assess macro-
economic dynamic gains and even more to simulate or assess the distribution of gains and losses
among different individual firms and households, and across regions. The distribution of gains
and losses among individuals and across districts that may result from trade liberalization is
rather unpredictable. The only certainty is that it is unlikely that there will be only winners.
Against this background, a number of bilateral trade agreements have recently been negoti-
ated. The EU-Japan Partnership Agreement（EPA）is the one of the most important agreements
owing to the aggregate size of the economies involved and the magnitude of the trading flows.
It is therefore legitimate to wonder what the motivations for the EPA have been. The com-
mitment of both sides to reach an agreement, despite uncertainties regarding the outcomes, sug-
gests that geopolitical rather than economic motivations dominate. This is certainly the case for
the Japanese side, but the present article focuses on the motivations of the EU side. Section 2
presents the global context of free trade agreements and the scope of the EPA ; section 3 dis-
cusses the EU’s perception of Japanese motivations and its own motivations for the EPA ; section
4 presents concluding remarks.
2. Global context of free trade agreements and scope of the EPA
While the global arrangement in international trade liberalization between the 1960s and the
1990s was characterized by some regionalism agreements（e.g., the European Union）, in a multi-
lateral world based on WTO agreements（Ethier 1998）, the stalemate at the WTO since the 2000
s resulted in a reinforcement of multilateral regionalism（Baldwin 2006）. A proliferation of bilat-
eral FTA was observed in East and Southeast Asia in particular, with some of the most important
agreements involving the ASEAN as a whole2, but most were signed by pairs of individual coun-
tries. The complexity and lack of transparency, which have been described as a “noodle soup
bowl” of bilateral agreements, resulted in not only sizable costs incurred by the firms involved in
international trade in terms of collecting, processing, and analysing information, but also opportu-
nities to take advantage of differentials tariff rates. The complexity resulting from the proliferation
of bilateral FTA did not prevent the main trading partners from negotiating new treaties. For ex-
2 With Japan in 2008 ; with China, India, and Australia in 2010.
44 商 経 論 叢 第55巻第1・2合併号（2019．12）
ample, in the case of Japan, with Australia（2008）, Chile（2006）, India（2011）, Mexico（2005）,
and more recently Switzerland and the EU（2018）. The EU has also contributed to this prolifera-
tion by establishing FTA with neighbouring countries and also with more distant emerging econo-
mies.3 More recently, the EU has also negotiated FTA with South Korea（2015）and Canada
（2016）before signing the EPA with Japan.
The trade agreement between the EU and Japan is of paramount importance considering the
economic size of the two partners and the magnitude of the bilateral flows of goods and services.
The official statement of the European Commission indicates that the aim of the trade agreement
with Japan is to remove（in fact, drastically reduce）trade barriers to stimulate growth on both
sides（in fact, create new business opportunities for firms, which could stimulate growth）. The
two partners have also reaffirmed their commitment to achieve an ambitious and comprehensive
agreement to help shape global trade rules and to send a powerful signal that two of the world’s
largest economies reject protectionism.
The negotiation process with the EPA has been relatively smooth and rapid. In 2013, the EU
governments instructed the European Commission to start negotiations with Japan. On 6 July
2017, the European Union and Japan reached an agreement in principle on the main elements of
the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement. On 8 December 2017, the negotiations were fi-
nalized. After the legal verification and translation processes, the European Commission then sub-
mitted the agreement for the approval of the European Parliament and EU member states.4
The EU has also negotiated a Strategic Partnership Agreement in parallel with Japan. The of-
ficial statement of the European Commission indicates that the aim is to broaden the partnership
in order to cooperate closely with one another in international and multilateral fora including the
UN, WTO, and the G7 and G20. The rationale is that, as advanced, industrialized democracies,
the EU and Japan share fundamental values and have common interests.5 The Strategic Partner-
ship Agreement（SPA）, a legally binding pact, covers not only political dialogue and policy coop-
eration, but also cooperation on regional and global challenges, including the environment and cli-
mate change, development policy and disaster relief, and security policy.
Associating economic and strategic agreements is in line with the policy of the EU Commis-
sion, implemented not only within the EU but also with external partners. This is however a rela-
tively new experience for Japan, which has been involved in a bilateral strategic partnership with
3 With Turkey in 1996, Tunisia in 1998, Mexico and Morocco in 2000, South Africa in 2000, Chile in 2003,
Egypt in 2004, and Algeria in 2005.
4 http : //ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-japan-economic-partnership-agreement/index_en.htm
5 https : //eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/19223/eu-japan-political-relations_en
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the United States of America（USA）since the post-war era, but with no economic equivalent with
this key partner since the trade relations between the two countries where essentially defined by
their commitment to multilateral agreements.
3. The EU’s perception of Japanese motivations for the EPA, and its own mo-
tivations
There is no official statement of the European Commission regarding its perception of the
Japanese motivations for signing the EPA. It is nevertheless reasonable to consider that the fol-
lowing conditions have been regarded by EU members countries and the European Commission
as critical :
- Japan is one of the few countries in the world that is not involved（at least officially）in a re-
gional economic agreement（APEC is not a regional economic agreement but a Forum） ;
- The Japanese economy is not complementary with the EU economy, but Japanese firms are in-
terested in enhanced access to the European market ;
- As a way to promote productivity gains（resulting from enhanced competition）, the Japanese
government is willing to open market access not only for goods but also for services ;
- To enhance productivity in manufacturing and services, the Japanese government is keen to
promote investment in Japan（for the local market and for export）by European firms ;
- The Japanese government is willing to cooperate with the EU to strengthen the Japanese geo-
political position in the framework of the United Nations（lobbying for a permanent seat on
the Security Council）, as well as vis-à-vis China, North Korea, Russia, and more recently the
USA.
These considerations help to understanding the willingness of the Japanese side to consider
economic and political commitments, which is, as mentioned above, the traditional approach of
the EU.
The EU’s economic motivations are less obvious. The main reason is that the Japanese indus-
trial structure is as diversified as the European one with the same type of specialisation in human
capital-intensive productions. In particular, the Japanese manufacturing sector is specialised in the
production of high-quality capital and consumer goods for the global market, which is exactly the
same specialization as the German manufacturing sector. Overall, very limited gains from trade
can be expected. It is likely that there will be winners and losers, but the magnitude of gains and
losses is difficult to anticipate, and it is difficult to predict the distribution of gains and losses
among firms. The most likely outcome is that there will be gains for most large European firms
（enhanced access to the Japanese market）, and losses for a number of smaller European firms
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（higher exposure to competition from Japanese firms on the European market）. It is even more
difficult to predict the regional distribution of gains and losses ; the most likely outcome is that
there will be net gains in a number of already very successful industrial districts, particularly in
Germany, and net losses in most other regions.
It can be therefore argued that major motivations of the EU for the EPA are related to the
global vision of the European Commission, its internal difficulties and its geopolitical concerns.
Until the 2000s, the EU’s objectives in terms of international relations have been to promote inte-
gration of central European countries,6 economic regionalism（promoting the EU model of inte-
gration, particularly in the ASEAN and the MERCOSUR）, and bilateral cooperation with neigh-
bouring countries.7 The enlargement has been successful in economic terms but the European
Commission is experiencing increasingly conflictual relations with a number of central European
countries ; ASEAN and MERCOSUR have not been receptive to the EU proposals and the neigh-
bouring policy has been a failure, particularly in the East where it has resulted in tension with
Russia. The same remarks apply to the relations with a number of Arab countries and Turkey.
This helps to understand a shift in the international agenda of the EU in favor of FTA with
countries not involved in regional agreements（particularly Japan and South Korea）. This objec-
tive has became more relevant since 2008, in the context of the Eurozone crisis and strong per-
ception of democratic deficit and lack of legitimacy of the European Commission, as it contributed
to fostering the position of the European Commission with some tangible success in international
relations, which go some way to compensating for the internal difficulties and failures.
From the viewpoint of the European member states, the EPA also has some attractive fea-
tures related to geopolitical issues. In the context of uneasy relations between the European Com-
mission and a number of EU countries with the USA, the EPA is a way to strengthen the rela-
tions with a rather dependable partner. Until then, European NATO countries and Japan, as allies
of the USA, were implicitly allies but had limited bilateral cooperation in issues related to interna-
tional security. The EPA creates an explicit framework of strategic cooperation, although an am-
biguous coalition of countries exists on the European side since not all NATO countries are EU
members（Turkey in particular is a major NATO country）, and vice versa.
6 Enlargement of the EU resulting in the inclusion of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the
three Baltics countries, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, and Croatia in
2013.
7 Middle East and North Africa, Ukraine, Georgia, and former Soviet Republics excluding Russia.
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4. Conclusion
Considering that the economic gains from trade liberalization are at best case rather modest,
and potentially damaging for a number of firms on both sides, the SPA between the EU and Ja-
pan can be regarded as the most important component of the EPA. Although the content of the
SPA remains to be defined to a large extent, it appears that there is potential for a cooperative
positive sum game. It is likely that, in relations with Japan, the next objective of the EU will be to
promote cooperation in political fora（e.g., permanent seats for Germany and Japan at the UN Se-
curity Council）, scientific cooperation（possibly with the same type of involvement in EU re-
search programmes as Switzerland and Norway）, and military cooperation（particularly with the
proposed “European Army”）.
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